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(4) Jurisdiction
2. Jurisdiction. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2(a)-3
(2)(j), which states "(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: .... (j) cases transferred to the Court of
Appeals from the Supreme Court."
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(5) Issues for Review:
5.1 Can Utah's garnishment law allow garnishment of retirement assets under 29
U.S.C. 1144(a), for the purposes of discoveiy or any other purpose? Was the
ruling of Judge Toomey that this was legally allowed correct?
The trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and ordinances is a question of law
reviewed for correctness. See, e.g., Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201,
1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor ex rel. CT. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 1999);
Loporto v. Hoegemann, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (judicial
code); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518,
521 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)
A question of legislative intent associated with statutory interpretation is a matter
of law, not of fact. State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469, 471-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Whether a statute applies to a particular set of facts is a question of law. See Slisze
v. Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 319 (Utah 1999); State v. Burgess, 870 P.2d
276, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (noting which statute governs defendant's
placement is question of law reviewed for correctness).
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 1041, R. 1411-1414, and transcript page
23.
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5.2 Will Utah's law preempted by federal law?
The trial court's inteipretation of statutes, rules and ordinances is a question of law
reviewed for correctness. See, e.g.. Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201,
1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor ex rel. C.T. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 1999);
Loporto v. Hoegemann, 370 Utah Adv. Rep. 21, 22 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (judicial
code); A.K. & R. Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Aspen Constr., 977 P.2d 518,
521 (Utah Ct. App. 1999)
A question of legislative intent associated with statutory interpretation is a matter
of law, not of fact. State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d469, 471-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Whether a statute applies to a particular set of facts is a question of law. See Slisze
v. Stanley-Bostitch, 979 P.2d 317, 319 (Utah 1999); State v. Burgess, 870 P.2d
276, 279 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (noting which statute governs defendant's
placement is question of law reviewed for correctness).
This issue was preserved for appeal at R. 1411-1414. Even if not preserved, a
determination by a Utah Court that state garnishment law may attach ERISA
exempt retirement accounts will lead to the preemption of the entire law by a
federal court.
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(6)Citations to determinative law.
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) Assignment or alienation of plan benefits
(1) Each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided under the plan may not
be assigned or alienated.

29 U.S.C. 1144. Other laws ( ERISA sec. 514)
(a) Supersedure; effective date Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section,
the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter 111 of this chapter shall supersede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee
benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section
1003(b) of this title. This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
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(7) Statement of the Case:
Nature of Case, course of proceedings, and disposition.
Defendant and Appeallee issued a writ of garnishment against retirement accounts
which are exempt from attachment under 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1). See order of
Judge Toomey at R. 1401.
The court of Judge Toomey concluded that this act was permissible under Utah
law and failed to vacate the order of garnishment. See order at R. 1401, which
states:
The Court concludes that although the Defendants obtained the
Plaintiffs Fidelity account numbers from the Plaintiff, a creditor is
not obligated to accept a debtor's characterization of the nature of an
account. Although there are alternative lawful means by which a
judgment creditor may obtain information about the identity and
nature of a judgment debtor's assets, the means employed here—
applying for and obtaining a Writ of Garnishment using information
already known to the judgment creditor—were permissible.
Accordingly, the Defendants did not act in bad faith in obtaining the
Writ of Garnishment.
8.1 Summary of Argument that Utah's garnishment law does not allow
garnishment of retirement assets under 29 U.S.C. 1144(a), for the purposes of
discovery or any other purpose.
The ruling of Judge Toomey found at R. 1401 that "applying for and obtaining a
Writ of Garnishment using information already known to the judgment creditor-
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were permissible" is unsupported by any citations to Utah case law, written law,
rules of the court, or any other citation.
Plaintiff and appellant is unable to find any law from the state of Utah which
supports the Court's position.
8.2 Summary of argument that Utah's law is preempted by federal law?
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) requires that the accounts in question may not be attached.
Garnishment by a court of Utah is an attachment.
If this action is allowed for any reason by any Utah law or rule, 29 U.S.C. 1144
preempts the state law.
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(9) Argument.
9.1 5Can Utah's garnishment law allow garnishment of retirement assets under 29
U.S.C. 1144(a), for the purposes of discovery or any other purpose? Was the
ruling of Judge Toomey that this was legally allowed correct?
The ruling of Judge Toomey found at R. 1401 that "applying for and obtaining a
Writ of Garnishment using information already known to the judgment creditorwere permissible" is unsupported by any citations to Utah case law, written law,
rules of the court, or any other citation.
Plaintiff and appellant is unable to find any law from the state of Utah which
supports the Court's position.
The decision of the trial court itself is sufficient to establish that Utah law, as
applied to plaintiff and appellant, is that his ERISA exempt retirement accounts
may be lawfully garnished in the state of Utah.
It is not my job to protect the State of Utah's interests. Go ahead and affirm the
trial court ruling if you feel lucky.
9.2 Will Utah's law preempted by federal law?
29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) requires that the accounts in question may not be attached.
Garnishment by a court of Utah is an attachment.
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If this action is allowed for any reason by any Utah law or rule, 29 U.S.C. 1144
preempts the state law.
This includes the failure of a defendant to raise the issue in the trial court. A
ERISA exempt account may not be defaulted by failure to act.
This also includes the failure of a defendant to properly prepare any legal
document. Any State laws that technicalities allow attachment are void and
preempted.
This includes the failure to properly prepare an appellate brief as grounds for
ruling attachment or garnishment is proper. Any state law which allows
attachment is preempted.
This includes as a sanction for intentional contempt of court as a ground for
attaching the accounts, any state law is preempted.
This includes the typical and unconstitutional practice of "affirm on any grounds'
by the Utah Court of appeals. Any and all state law is preempted if it allows the
attachment of retirement accounts.
This includes allowing attachment for failure to raise other defenses or issues.
Any state law which allows attachment is void and preempted.
This includes any inherent authority of the State court to manage it's process and
procedure. Any state law which allows attachment is void and preempted.
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This includes the failure of an appellant to cite authority for his argument or form
it properly in any legal terms. All state law is preempted.
This includes the failure of an appellant to conectly appeal a decision, or to timely
appeal the decision, or to exhaust state remedies as allowing the attachment of
such an account. All state law is preempted.
This includes failure to attach transcripts or other parts of the record necessary for
an appeal. All state law is preempted.
This includes any formatting or binding errors in any brief. All state law is
preempted.
This includes anything at all which a State court of appeals can rule, for any
reason, allowing attachment of retirement assets. All state law is preempted.
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(10) Relief Sought
10.1 Petitioner asks that the Court of Appeals review the ruling of Judge Toomey
for legal correctness, and determine if her ruling is the law in the state of Utah,
despite the scant briefing supplied by Plaintiff.
10.2 Petitioner asks that the Court of Appeals declare that Utah's garnishment law
is void and preempted by 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d), and to remand the case to the trial
court for further proceedings.
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(11) Only order of the court is attached.

Dated this ^ > day of December, 2007
oger Brynej*
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE1 OF UTAH

ROGER BRYNER,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MINUTE ENTRY

:

CASE ,NO. 050922650

:

EMILY SMOAK and COHNE,
RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.,
Defendants.

The matter of the Verified Motion to Vacate Garnishment of
Fidelity Retirement Assets came before the Court for hearing on
January 24, 2007.
The Plaintiff, Roger Bryner, was present and
represented by counsel, David W. Brown; the Defendants were
represented by Howard Lundgren. Having read! the Verified Motion;
the Defendants' Memorandum in Opposition to1 Plaintiff's Verified
Motion to Vacate Garnishment of Fidelity Retirement Assets; the
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Vacate Garnishment of
Fidelity Retirement Accounts; the Affidavit of Roger Bryner in
Support of Vacating Garnishment of Fidelity Retirement Accounts;
and the Exhibits submitted by the Plaintiff; and having heard the
arguments of counsel, the Court makes this Minute Entry.
In October 2006, the Defendants in this action received a
judgment against the Plaintiff.
On December 1, 2006, the
Defendants applied for and obtained a Writ of Garnishment directed
to Fidelity Investments ("Fidelity") identifying specific accounts
in the name of the Plaintiff.- The Writ of Garnishment was served
on Fidelity the same day.
The Defendants learned the Plaintiff's Fidelity account
numbers from interrogatory responses provided by the Plaintiff in
the course of litigation of another matter.
The Plaintiff's

Other writs were also obtained, but these are not in
issue here.

interrogatory responses provided the Fidelity account numbers and
stated the type of account. The Defendants Used this information
m applying for the Writ of Garnishment.
By letter, Fidelity notified the Defendants that the accounts
specified in the Writ of Garnishment are retirement accounts. The
letter is dated Decemoer 5, 2006, but the date' December 11, 2006 is
also stamped on it.
On December 14, 2006, the Plaintiff filed his Verified Motion
to Vacate Garnishment of Fidelity Retirement Assets, requesting
vacation of the writ, an injunction against the Defendants from
further attempts to garnish retirement accounts, and a finding that
the writ was obtained in bad faith.
The Defendants filed a Release of Garnishment Re: Fidelity
Investments on December 19, 2006 based upon having been told by
Fidelity the nature of the accounts, which "therefore constitute
exempt assets."
On the same day, Mr. Brown entered hii appearance in this
matter as counsel for the Plaintiff.
On December 20, 2006, the Court conducted a hearing on several
outstanding motions. The Court's Order of Dedember 29, 2006, which
was prepared by counsel for the Plaintiff, among other things
stated "Defendants have withdrawn their claims against Plaintiff's
retirement accounts.
Defendants' garnishment against Fidelity
Investments shall be released."
No funds were removed from any of the Plaintiff's Fidelity
retirement accounts.
The Court concludes that although the Defendants obtained the
Plaintiff's Fidelity account numbers from the Plaintiff, a creditor
is not obligated to accept a debtor's cnatacterization of the
nature of an account. Although there are alternative lawful means
by which a judgment creditor may obtain information about the
identity and nature of a judgment debtor's assets, tne means
employed here—applying for and obtaining a Writ of Garnishment
using information already known to the judgment creditor—were
permissible. Accordingly, the Defendants did not act in bad faith
m obtaining the Writ of Garnishment.
Having been informed by Fidelity that the accounts are
retirement accounts, the Defendants appropriately submitted a
Release of Garnishment Re: Fidelity Investments. The letter from
Fidelity to the Defendants containing this information was dated
December 5, 2006, but may have been received by the Defendants as
late as December 11, 2006.
The Defendants filed and served the

release on December 19, 2006.
Rule
64 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, governing Writs in General, does' not specify a time
frame for submitting such a release. The Court concludes that this
was a de minimus period, whether it is calculated from December 5
or December 11, and the interval between the Dfefendants' receipt of
the letter and its filing and service of the release does not
constitute bad faith.
Utah Code section 78-23-13 provides in material part as
follows: xxAn individual . . . is entitled tjo injunctive relief,
damages, or both, against a creditor or otherj person to prevent or
redress a violation of this cnapt-er. A court may award costs and
reasonable attorney's fees to a party entitled to injunctive relief
or damages."
The release having been filed, and indeed the Court having
noted in its Order that
"Defendants have withdrawn their claims
against Plaintiff's retirement accounts. Defendants' garnishment
against Fidelity Investments shall be released[,]" the Court
concludes that the Plaintiff's motion to ;vacate the Writ of
Garnishment is moot and unnecessary, and is therefore denied.
Likewise, the Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief as
stated in his Verified Motion to Vacate Garnishment of Fidelity
Retirement Assets is moot and unnecessary. , Injunctive relief is
prospective in nature, and because the Defendants have withdrawn
their claims against the retirement accounts^ there is nothing to
enjoin for the purpose of preventing a violation of the Utah
Exemptions Act. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's motion for injunctive
relief is denied. If the Defendants submit & new application for
garnishment of the same Fidelity retirement adcounts, the Plaintiff
may bring this to the Court's attention for fiirther consideration.
The Plaintiff's broader requests for injunctive relief set
forth in the Reply Memorandum in Support |of Motion to Vacate
Garnishment of Fidelity Retirement Accounts and in the oral
argument are also denied. These requests are moot and unnecessary,
and with respect to any request to enjoin 'Fidelity, exceed the
Court's authority.
As noted above, Utah Code section 78-23-13 permits a court to
award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to a party entitled to
injunctive relief or damages. 2 The Court hds concluded that the
Plaintiff is not entitled to injunctive relief, and therefore an
award of attorney's fees is not appropriate.

The Plaintiff has not claimed damaged.

The Plaintiff's Verified Motion to Vacate Garnishment of
Fidelity Retirement Accounts is denied.
Thts Minute Entry will
stand as the Court's Order.

Dated this £5

~~ day of January, 2007

[^CKX^A
. \
KATE A. TOOMEY '
DISTRICT COURT JU

